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There is Room for Even More Doublethink: The Perilous
Status of Psychoanalytic Research
Peter Fonagy, Ph.D., DipPsy, FBPSA, FBA
University College London
The opposition between psychoanalysis and systematic interdisciplinary research is to be regretted.
The target article attempts to bridge the intellectual divide and for this aim as well as the intellectual
adroitness shown it is to be celebrated. Much harder to understand is the high level of affect generated
by the debate. Accusations of “doublethink” are helpful. The present paper, like the target paper it
follows, attempts to develop an understanding of the position of those who are categorically opposed
to interdisciplinary systematic research linked to psychoanalysis. Appreciating the perspective of
those deeply opposed to such work could help to create a shared agenda from which our troubled
discipline could beneﬁt. This is predicated on the possibility of an open collegial dialogue which this
journal was founded to create.
I offer this contribution in appreciation and strong support of Jeremy Safran’s (2012) cri-
tique of Irvin Hoffman’s broadside against “Doublethinking” by psychoanalytic researchers.
Amongst life’s many ironies was the coinciding of the appearance in the Journal of the American
Psychoanalytic Association of Irvin Hoffman’s (2009) paper and the appearance in the British
Journal of Psychiatry of a three-round debate between Lewis Wolpert, the renowned develop-
mental biologist, and me with the theme “There Is No Place for the Psychoanalytic Case Report
in the British Journal of Psychiatry” (Wolpert & Fonagy, 2009). I was arguing against Wolpert,
who proposed that the psychoanalytic case study had no information of signiﬁcance to contribute
to modern psychiatry. To argue for case reports in the British Journal of Psychiatry was admit-
tedly fairly hopeless, given that so few are published in this high impact journal. The debate was
perhaps set up in this way by the editor of the journal, Professor Tyrer, who is no great fan of
psychoanalytic psychiatry, perhaps to discourage psychoanalysts from submitting case reports to
him (hardly a serious risk). But imagine my surprise when I returned bloodied from this debate
and picked up the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, “my home team’s jour-
nal,” to ﬁnd myself depicted as a dangerous opponent of case studies. I had been rhetorically
tried and convicted of “scientiﬁc doublethink” in advocating that our discipline should join forces
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 THERE IS ROOM FOR EVEN MORE DOUBLETHINK 117
across psychoanalytic schools in an “effort to make the best case possible for psychoanalysis as
a clinical method” (Fonagy, 2002, p. 58).
THE STATUS OF THE RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIAL
Once I had overcome my immediate reaction, which was a toxic combination of self-pity and
indignation, I started reﬂecting on what might be the underlying issues here. I am gratiﬁed to see
that Jeremy Safran arrived at the same conclusions with greater clarity and presented them with
superior eloquence than I could then or now have mustered. I agree with Jeremy Safran that no
one would get out of bed to defend randomized controlled clinical trials (RCTs). Not even the
leader of evidence based medicine in the United Kingdom—Sir Michael Rawlins, the Director
of our National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence—sees RCT methodology as a royal
road to understanding outcomes. In his Harveian Oration, Rawlins (2008) identiﬁed many major
bioethical, legal, and conceptual problems with RCTs, including small sample sizes requiring
massive effect sizes for signiﬁcance; additional difﬁculties if the aim of the RCT was to show
no difference (the problems of equivalence trials, nonsuperiority studies, futility designs); lack of
generalizability of the results collected from selected populations for a ﬁnite time as opposed to
real heterogeneous populations with comorbidities, usually treated over longer periods of time,
from different ethnic backgrounds and socioeconomic status; differences in the dose, timing, and
durationoftherapy,comedicationandcomparativeeffectiveness,andsoon.Heasksthenontrivial
question: Can the beneﬁts for the average patient in an RCT be extrapolated to “average” patients
in clinical settings? Now, is Sir Michael Rawlins, the person in charge of the organization that
deﬁnes appropriate care for the 30 million patients seen in the British National Health Service
each year, guilty of Orwellian doublethink for raising questions about the key tool that his orga-
nization uses to deﬁne protocols for all but the most unusual of disorders? I don’t think so. He is
showing skepticism appropriate to scientists about the limitations of his experimental methods.
The doublethink is slightly more pernicious in our case. Hoffman (2009, p. 1056, in a “telling
footnote”) referred to a recent report by Leichsenring and Rabung (2008) concerning the effec-
tiveness of long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy in terms of effect size, relative to the effects
normally observed in short-term cognitive behavioral treatments. This citation, while of little sig-
niﬁcance in itself, illustrates a larger problem. Hoffman, and many other psychoanalysts, would
readily accept uncritically the authors’ claim of a demonstration of superiority because it ﬁts
with our a priori views. In fact, the limited number of studies available (summarized in the
Journal of the American Medical Association article) are not necessarily representative of ordi-
nary psychoanalytic practice in terms of either the patient population that was under scrutiny
(largely a severely personality disordered group) or the therapeutic procedures used in the reports
summarized. These facts do not escape the scientist but might be overlooked by those who wish
to search for and ﬁnd evidence for the validity of their current practice. Many of us have argued
that training in research methodology should be taken more seriously by psychoanalytic institutes
in order to avoid this, and to ensure that such judgments are made in a more sophisticated way
(Emde & Fonagy, 1997).
The purpose of undertaking systematic empirical studies (qualitative or quantitative) is not
to conﬁrm beliefs already held but to expose oneself to the possibility of surprise. Not that this
is by any means the privileged domain of the empiricist. I was certainly surprised to read the
extraordinary claim that clinical psychoanalytic research is free from risk of a conﬁrmatory bias
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 118 FONAGY
because the “ambiguity of psychoanalytic data leave them relatively unmanipulable in the sense
of stacking the cards in favor of one or another point of view” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 1052). This is
a strong empirical statement, and if conﬁrmed would indeed place psychoanalysis in a privileged
epistemic position. It is hard to see, given what psychoanalysis has taught us about the power of
unconscious emotional control over human cognition, that the naivety of the average clinician
would be such as to render him or her unable to bias her or his memory in the direction of greater
compliance with convictions, even if these are only unconsciously held. Jeremy Safran accepts
Hoffman’s claim apparently uncritically. I have to confess to being extremely skeptical that
clinical notes based on recollections gathered some time after a 45-minute session will indeed
provide an account of the proceedings that remains as untainted by unconscious motivation as
Hoffman anticipates.
Irrespective of the epistemic status of clinical reports, it is beyond doubt that the experience of
engaging in clinical work offers most of us a far more direct and important route to progress in
treatment techniques than the most sophisticated process-outcome studies. Speaking personally,
it was the repeated failures I experienced working with severely personality disordered patients
using classical analytic methods that led me to explore non-insight-oriented, mentalization-based
techniques and attachment theory conceptualizations (Fonagy & Target, 2007). This brings us to
the second substantive point, the status of the case study.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CASE STUDY
The second controversial issue identiﬁed by Safran concerns the privileging of quantitative
research over the case study method. As Safran pointed out, stating these as epistemic alternatives
is a mere rhetorical device to facilitate the contrast of “constructivism” with “objectivism.” We
can all see that the dichotomy is falsely stated. No self-respecting scientist would deny the role of
meaning-making in interpreting ﬁndings. We all know that in an ideal world facts should speak
for themselves but sadly in our human scientiﬁc world they often appear to do so only when
accompanied by a chorus of approval. This admission does not indicate epistemic equivalence
between research and clinical pursuits. At issue here is not only the appropriateness or otherwise
of single subject methodology for scientiﬁc advance in general but the particular appropriate-
ness of such methods for psychoanalysis. Let me summarize brieﬂy the argument against the
psychoanalytic case report as advanced by Lewis Wolpert and then consider a defense.
Wolpert’s argument was not against case reports per se. He accepted the importance of case
studies in medicine in general and psychiatry in particular. However, he rejected the validity of
reports of individual treatments that are not presented against a backdrop of a tightly knit web of
scientiﬁc theories concerning psychopathology and the theory of therapeutic effects. Wolpert’s
claim is that in the absence of a coherent and robust understanding, there is “nothing useful to
be learned from a case report on an individual that could help other patients. Each case is essen-
tially the relationship between an analyst and the patient” (Wolpert & Fonagy, 2009, p. 483).
On reading Hoffman’s article I would presume that he would concur with Wolpert. But whereas
Hoffman feels that such uniqueness should be a spur to the further exploration of human idiosyn-
crasy, Wolpert feels that the strength of individual case reports lies in detailed observation being
able to disconﬁrm previously held preconceptions. Studied in adequate detail and with sufﬁcient
regard for controlling for obvious alternative accounts, a single case can present a conjunction of
phenomena that might require a radical reevaluation of prior beliefs.
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
6
:
0
1
 
2
8
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
1
4
 THERE IS ROOM FOR EVEN MORE DOUBLETHINK 119
But a coherent theoretical frame is essential to this process. Repeated demonstrations of
individuality and uniqueness, and a general lack of predictability, however emotionally and
intellectually gripping, will mostly fail for scientiﬁc purposes and will be of limited epistemic
value other than the didactic function of illustrating the author’s strongly held convictions.
Studying the history of psychoanalysis, it is hard to disagree with Wolpert. Wolpert cited Arnie
Cooper’s (2008, p. 235) trenchant critique of contemporary pluralism, which “is to a surprising
degree a multiplicity of authoritarian orthodoxies, each derived from a particular thinker rather
than a scientiﬁc discourse.” A semi-inevitable consequence or indication of the absence of dialec-
tical constructivism in modern psychoanalytic discourse is the increasing tendency on the part of
psychoanalytic writers to cite a more and more narrow range of recent articles, rarely venturing
outside their conceptual comfort zone (Fonagy, 2003).
If we are to retain psychoanalytic case reports in a mainstream psychiatric journal, we have to
concede that special pleading for a unique epistemology of psychoanalysis is no more justiﬁed
than it would be for any other subdiscipline of mental health sciences. Claiming that our science
is governed by distinct epistemic principles is hard to support given the variety of alternative
psychological frameworks attempting to capture the complexity of human subjectivity which are
vying for recognition in psychiatry, each with different epistemic strengths and weaknesses. All
are faced with similar challenges of sometimes elusive phenomena, the unsatisfactory nature of
probabilistic inference, the need for special conditions for observation, and the risk that the avail-
able tools do not capture adequately the phenomena of greatest interest. However, we can assert
that regardless of the standards of rigor of current clinical practice, there is nothing inherently
unscientiﬁc about the psychoanalytic clinical situation. Further, the intensity of the interpersonal
encounter involved in three or four times weekly psychotherapy has the potential to offer insights
that are likely to be vital for a comprehensive appreciation of the human social condition. In par-
ticular, psychoanalytic observation enables us to question that which we might otherwise most
readily overlook. I recall with appreciation Jonathan Lear’s (1998) comment, “Psychoanalysis
begins in wonder that the unintelligibility of the events that surround one do not cause more
wonder” (p. 28).
The argument for case studies rests, in my view, in the potential for us to be blinded in ordi-
nary discourse or observation to the proliferation of meanings that characterize the activity of
human subjectivity. These all too readily escape what Lear (1998) termed “knowingness.” Our
unique commitment as psychoanalysts is to relentlessly pursue and study the truth behind the
ordinary, what Hannah Arendt (2006) evocatively described as “the banality of evil.” Human
(self-)destructiveness, perhaps entailed in the classical metaphor of the death instinct (Freud,
1920), is hardly the preserve of fanatics or sociopaths. It is also characteristic of ordinary minds
too willing to accept the premises of their social context, who persist in viewing their experi-
ence of their actions as normal. These ordinary encounters provide the nomological network of
meanings that justify the description of psychoanalytic therapeutic practice even in high-impact
scientiﬁc journals. The meanings that are created in the intersubjective space between patient and
therapist are essential to the understanding of the complex relationship representations, where
answers to the most fundamental questions about the human motivational system lie.
Hoffman offers the case of Neil, an impulsive man who was sent to a pharmacologist by his
analyst to ﬁnally deal with his angry emotional outbursts. The condescending attitude of the
physician enraged Neil so much that he vowed to control his temper on his own. He brought
his consciousness to bear on his actions, and his self-report indicates a 98% reduction in the
frequency of explosions. I am mentioning this example because on reading it I felt it was a
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 120 FONAGY
wonderful illustration of the value of the psychoanalytic case report. It shows that, contrary to
many psychoanalytic theories, insight could not be considered to provide a satisfactory account of
Neil’s dramatic improvement. One may speculate that the unconscious fear of his analyst’s rejec-
tion (triggered by the referral to another professional) sensitized Neil to the attitude of the con-
descending physician. The rage with the doctor may also be seen as a displacement of anger with
his analyst and his improvement as a transferentially provoked ﬂight into health (Dysart, 1977;
Wallerstein, 2000). But the dynamic unconscious was largely silent in this intriguing incident.
What Hoffman’s tiny example powerfully points to is the dramatic and radical need for a psy-
choanalytically clinically informed reconsideration of the nature of consciousness, which might
ultimately shed some light also on the dynamic unconscious and the relations of the conscious
and unconscious minds. The focus of psychoanalytic interest has always been the unconscious.
In his “Outline of Psychoanalysis,” Freud (1938) wrote, “There is no need to characterize what
we call ‘conscious’: it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion”
(p. 159). Consciousness is taken as given and the contents of consciousness are viewed merely as
signposts to the depths. Present preoccupations, memories, current or recent physical sensations
and descriptions, physical manifestations of emotions, and more are explored in pursuit of asso-
ciative networks that give hints of the mental states hidden and disguised by consciousness. This
principle is one of the best established tenets of our discipline. But Neil’s example suggests that
seeing consciousness merely as a route to concerns outside awareness underestimates its role in
the dynamics of mind and clinical psychoanalysis. In the “Outline” Freud himself did acknowl-
edge the mysteriousness of consciousness, stating that “the starting-point for this investigation is
provided by a fact without parallel, which deﬁes all explanation or description—the fact of con-
sciousness” (p. 157). It is self-evident that the unconscious mind cannot be explicated without
reference to consciousness.
THE NATURE OF DOUBLETHINK AND THE NATURE OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
It is my sense then that Irwin Hoffman, Jeremy Safran, and I are broadly in agreement about the
unique value of psychoanalytic case methods. Nor would I disagree that adequate critical scrutiny
of clinical material can advance the inquiry of the theoretician as well as the skills of the clin-
ical analyst. My own reporting of cases has, in one instance at least, beneﬁted from Hoffman’s
critical commentary (Hoffman, 2004). So, given the deep level of agreement between these three
serious scholars (forgive the presumption in considering us to share this distinction), what may
be the motivation behind setting up an opposition between an idealized clinical analyst and a
doublethinking Orwellian researcher? Given the choice, most of us would wish to think of our-
selves as a person who “will stand for human freedom, for the dignity of the individual, for the
meaningfulness of community, and for the sacrosanct integrity of every moment of experience”
(Hoffman, 2009, pp. 1064–1065). Equally, few would opt to be psychoanalytic researchers if
this inevitably implied engaging in “subtle sado-masochistic complicity.” More puzzling for both
Safran and me is the assertion that researchers want to acquire and maintain “dominance over
other conceptions of psychoanalysis and other views as to what psychoanalysis ...requires to
establish its legitimacy” (p. 1058). I have to say that, as someone who particularly values saying
things explicitly, even when these ideas may prove to be unpopular, who came to value psycho-
analysis precisely because it was committed to pursuing that which one was most motivated to
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 THERE IS ROOM FOR EVEN MORE DOUBLETHINK 121
avoid, I ﬁnd it a little harsh to be depicted (even by implication) as someone who engages in
“conscious deception while retaining a ﬁrmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty”
(Orwell, Atet 1949/1961, p. 176).
However, all this is part of the rough-and-tumble of academic debate. It has always been
thus. Finding common ground is far less exciting than creating imaginary philosophical disparity.
Safran’s concern is to assert the importance of public demonstration of effectiveness both for
policymakers and clients of psychoanalytic therapy, many of whom, in seeking treatment, wish
for no more than relief from psychic pain. I naturally fully support this position, but wish to add
a further important research priority for which allowance must be made by clinicians. My con-
cern here is not primarily to do with Hoffman’s opposition to research as fact ﬁnding, but what
Safran also eloquently points to in his response: the misrepresentation of realistic acceptance of
the limitations of one’s method as some deep bizarrely motivated strategy to disempower one’s
opponents by the cunning device of humility. In my view, the attribution of capricious motive
to what is simple scientiﬁc principled honesty is deeply destructive, unscientiﬁc, and verging on
the immoral. Without acknowledging the limitations of our research methods, without exercising
constant and searching critique of the limitations of our ﬁndings, there can be no place for us at
the table of 21st–century academe.
Psychoanalytic researchers are accustomed to unprovoked and uncalled for attacks on their
work both from psychoanalytic colleagues and from academics hostile to analytic ideas. The
researchers’ interests have to be sustained by the subject matter, as the intrinsic rewards, in terms
of either academic promotion or popular recognition (by clinicians), are scarce. Most have an
ideological commitment and a concomitant wish to preserve psychoanalysis for university educa-
tion where most of us ﬁrst encountered psychoanalysis. Consciously or unconsciously, rightly or
wrongly, I believe researchers sense that unless they can keep the ﬂame of Freudian thinking alive
within universities the entire enterprise is doomed. The recruitment of bright energetic young
people is the lifeblood of every specialty. Researchers have to survive in increasingly harsh aca-
demic environments and have to intrigue students sufﬁciently for them to pursue psychoanalytic
interests. To ensure that psychoanalytic psychology will be taught to the next generation there is
no alternative but to engage with 21st-century academic discourse. Like it or not, in most aca-
demic centers this is the discourse of neuroscience and large sample size research. Psychoanalytic
researchers do not wish to constrain the clinician’s right to place at the forefront of their scientiﬁc
concern, the individuality of the patient and centrality of the person of the therapist. In fact, it
is precisely this kind of “ﬁrst-person psychology” (Northoff & Heinzel, 2006) that they wish to
explicate in their work.
CONCLUSION
So why use such strong rhetorical language to distance the clinical community from the individu-
als who try and protect the right of patients to access psychoanalytic therapies and the opportunity
of students to take an interest in psychodynamic psychology and clinical work? Given that neither
Jeremy Safran nor I see substantive differences between the value system that Hoffman’s paper
lays claim to and our own research-grounded moral and epistemic stance, I can see little merit in
either engaging in debate or rebutting tendentious moralizing rhetoric.
What Hoffman calls doublethink is nothing but the recognition by all self-respecting scientists,
including both Safran and myself, of the limitations of scientiﬁc methodology. At any one time
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
6
:
0
1
 
2
8
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
1
4
 122 FONAGY
scientists make do with the best they have. They hope to make progress with as much awareness
of the limitations of their methodology as possible. I hope that Hoffman’s call for a genuinely
critical dialogue in relation to the case study method integrates as much of this “doublethink” as
he can tolerate.
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